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Science and Human Well-Being
Toward a New Way of
Structuring Scientific Activity
Hugh Lacey

INTRODUCTION
Boaventura de Sousa Santos begins A Discourse on the Sciences by posing
Rousseau's question: "Is there a relationship between science and virtue?"
(Santos 1992, 10). He elaborates: "we must ask about the contribution of
all the accumulated scientific knowledge to enriching or impoverishing our
lives. In other words, we must ask if science has contributed positively or
negatively to our happiness" (Santos 1992, 11-12).
In this chapter, I address the related question: "How should science be
pursued in order to enhance human well-being?" Variations of this question have been suggested recently by philosophers of science. Here are two
of them:
the most important topic in the philosophy of science [is] the relation of science to human values. What contributions can or should science make to human well-being? ... If there is one conclusion of overriding importance to be
drawn from the increasing realization in recent times that science is a human
product, it is that, like other human products, the only way it can ultimately be
evaluated is in terms of whether it contributes to the thriving of sentient beings
in the universe. (Dupre 1993, 244, 264)
Reflective people ... want to know whether research in various areas is skewed
by the values of particular groups and, at the broadest level, how science bears
on human flourishing .... It has been obvious for about half a century that research yielding epistemic benefits may have damaging consequences for the individual or even the whole species. Philosophical stories about science have
been narrowly focused on the epistemic. Faced with lines of research that have
183
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the capacity to alter the environment in radical ways, to transform our self-understanding, and to interact with a variety of social institutions and social prejudices to affect human lives, there is a much larger problem of understanding
just how the sciences bear on human flourishing. (Kitcher 1998, 46) 1

Elsewhere (Lacey 2004a, xi), with these quotations in mind, I have affirmed
that there are rich dialectical interactions among the questions: "How to
conduct scientific research?" "How to structure society?" and "How to further human well-being?" Science must be appraised for the cognitive ( epistemic) value of its theoretical products and-when positively appraised
cognitively-it can (and should) also be appraised for its contribution to
social justice and human well-being. In this chapter I briefly explain why
this is so.

SCIENCE AS VALUE FREE
Throughout its 400-year history, there has been a strong tradition of the interpretation of modern science that maintains that the question, "How
should science be pursued in order to enhance human well-being?" is inappropriate; even posing it (or Rousseau's question) displays misunderstanding of the nature of science and threatens its integrity.
Impartiality, Autonomy, Neutrality

According to this interpretation, there is no role for values 2 at the core of
science: they should not be among the criteria for making scientific judgments, and they have no fundamental role in the practices of gaining and
appraising scientific understanding: the broad characteristics of scientific
methodology should be responsive only to the interest of gaining deepened
understanding of phenomena of the world, and the priorities and direction
of research should not be shaped systematically by particular values. I call
these two views, respectively, "impartiality of scientific judgment" and "autonomy of methodology." 3 They are held as ideals, values of scientific practices, sometimes not well manifested in actual fact.
Usually they are held together with neutrality, that science gives privilege
no particular social values-that scientific theories should exhibit cognitive
neutrality: social value judgments are not among their logical implications;
and applied neutrality: on application, in principle they can inform evenhandedly interests of a wide range of values. To a first approximation, these
three views together sum up what is meant by "science is value-free." 4 The integrity, legitimation, prestige and alleged universal value of science have often been tied to science is value free being highly manifested in the practices
of science for, it tends to be taken for granted, it is science conducted in
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such practices that has produced the technological applications that have so
transformed the world in recent times.
Three Moments of Scientific Activity
We may distinguish three moments (logically, not necessarily temporally
distinct), or decision-making points, of scientific activity (Lacey 20046 ):
M1 , where priorities and direction for research and appropriate methodologies are determined; M2, where theories (hypotheses) are appraised; and
M1' where scientific knowledge is applied. On the traditional interpretation,
M; and M2 are the core of science. M3 follows them and presupposes positive appraisal at M2 of the theories to be applied. At M1 values have not only
a legitimate but also an indispensable role; but at M 1 and M2 there is no
proper (or, at least, indispensable) role for them. As Baptista (2002, 96)an exemplary proponent of the view of science being sketched in this
section-wrote in criticising Santos (1992): "How could scientific knowledge have any moral coloring?" Even at Mv according to applied neutrality,
science does not serve any particular valuesi as Baptista (2002, 96) observes:
"The results of science are ethically and morally neutral." Scientific knowledge is available, in principle, to inform projects of interest to any values at
all; it may be used for good or evil, but when it is used for evil that reflects
not on scientific knowledge but on those who applied it. What happens at
the core of science cannot be held responsible for abusive uses to which scientific knowledge may be put. Nevertheless, those who share the traditional
interpretation insist that scientific knowledge has normally been, and will
continue to be, used for a great variety of good ends, because it has been the
source of so many "new possibilities and potentialities ... that have profoundly changed the conditions and even the quality of life of a large part
of humanities" (Baptista 2002, 83, 95; my translation) . It is a small step
from these assertions to the claim that science itself should be considered a
universal value.
I recognize the attraction of this interpretation of science and I do not
think that it is wholly mistaken. In order to get at its limitations and, at the
same time, to begin to explain why it has dominated the tradition of modern science, I will offer an alternative picture of scientific activity. 5

SCIENTIFIC ACTIVITY
Scientific Understanding
The objective of science may be put as follows: To gain, in systematic ways,
soundly (rationally) empirically grounded understanding of phenomena
and things (and of an increasing number and variety of them), where
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understanding includes accounts of what the phenomena (things) are, of
why that are the way they are, of the possibilities (including hitherto unactualized ones) that they allow in virtue of their own underlying powers and
the interactions into which they may enter, and of how to attempt to actualize these possibilities (Lacey 1999a, ch. 5). 6
Scientific understanding is articulated in theories, each of which offers understanding of a specified domain of phenomena, where the soundness of
the understanding articulated should be appraised in the light of available
empirical data, of whether the available data suffices for making reliable
cognitive judgments, and of cognitive criteria such as empirical adequacy
and explanatory power that are rational symptoms of having gained understanding and that do not depend on any value judgments (Lacey 2004a, ch.
3). When appraisals are soundly made solely in accordance with these considerations, I say that a theory (hypothesis) has been accepted in accordance with impartiality. The objective of science, then, might be restated as:
To generate and consolidate theories, accepted in accordance with impartiality, that progressively provide understanding of more and larger domains of phenomena and possibilities.
Impartiality is built into the quest for scientific understanding. Neutrality
is not-neither cognitive nor applied neutrality (section 1.1 ). Impartiality does
not imply neutrality (Lacey 2002a; 2004a, chs. 4, 10). When a theory is accepted in accordance with impartiality, its acceptance contributes towards
furthering the objective of science, but that does not mean tha\ h makes a
significant contribution. Reference to the objective (as stated above) does
not provide direction to research, define what counts as worthwhile or significant research (Kitcher 2001 ), or provide concrete answers to: What questions to pose, what puzzles to resolve, what classes of possibilities to attempt to identify, what kinds of explanations to explore, what categories to
deploy both in theories (hypotheses) and observational reports, what phenomena to observe, measure and experiment upon, who are the appropriate participants in research activity, what are their required qualifications,
life backgrounds and virtues?
Strategy: Constraints on Theories, Criteria for
Selection of Data; What Possibilities to Investigate

None of questions, just posed, can be addressed without the adoption of
what I call a strategy (Lacey 2002a; 2004a, ch. 5). The principal roles of a
strategy are to constrain the kinds of theories (hypotheses) that may be entertained in a given domain of inquiry (so as to enable investigation) and
the categories that they may deploy-and thus to specify the kinds of possibilities that may be explored in the course of the inquiry-and to select the relevant
kinds of empirical data to procure and the appropriate descriptive categories to use for making observational reports.7
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Different classes of possibilities may require different strategies for their
investigation. To borrow an example that I have used elsewhere (Lacey 2000;
2002c; 2003a; 2003b ), the possibilities of seeds qua components of sustainable agroecosystems are not identical to their possibilities qua objects of genetic engineering; both cannot be investigated under the same strategies and
both cannot be coactualized in the same agricultural spaces. A multiplicity
of competing strategies is required, if research is not to be limited in compass to a narrow (albeit potentially large) class of possibilities.
The scientific knowledge that informs genetic engineering is a product of
research conducted under a version (biotechnological) of what I call materialist strategies (Lacey 2002a; 2004a, ch. 6; 2004b ). Strategies of this kind
are adopted almost exclusively in modern science. Under them theories are
constrained so that they represent phenomena and encapsulate possibilities
in terms of their being generable from underlying structure, process, interaction
and law, dissociating them from any place they may have in relation to social arrangements, human lives and experience, from any link with value,
and from whatever social, human and ecological possibilities that may also
be open to them. Reciprocally, empirical data are selected, not only to meet
the condition of intersubjectivity, but also so that their descriptive categories are generally quantitative, applicable in virtue of measurement, instrumental and experimental operations. Under materialist strategies, intentional and value-laden categories are deliberately excluded from use in
the formulation of theories, hypotheses and data, so that where they are deployed there cannot be any value judgments among the formal entailments
of theories and hypotheses. Adopting them thus suffices to ensure cognitive
neutrality. This is a feature of their design.
Adopting materialist strategies does not suffice, however, to ensure applied
neutrality (Lacey 2001; 2004a, ch. 8-10; see quotes from Dupre and Kitcher
at the outset.) . The example about seeds provides a useful illustration.
When the biotechnological version of materialist strategies is adopted, the
possibilities for the transformation of seeds by techniques of genetic engineering can be identified; but their possibilities, when selected for use in
productive, sustainable agroecosystems in which biodiversity is protected
and community empowerment is furthered, cannot be, for these latter possibilities are not dissociated from social and experiential context. They can,
however, be identified by research conducted under agroecological strategies
(Lacey 2001; 2003a; 2003b ). 8
Mutually Reinforcing Relations between
Adopting a Strategy and Holding Values

Why, then, in the institutions of modern science do materialist strategies
tend to be adopted virtually exclusively so that, for example, research under
biotechnological strategies is strongly supported and that under agroecological
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strategies downplayed? Why, in these institutions, is it so difficult for research, other than that conducted under versions of materialist strategies,
even to be recognized as science? Why is the interpretation of science described in section 1 so dominant in these institutions that normally only
choice among versions of materialist strategies is recognized as belonging
to the methodological component of M1 ? The reasons cannot always be
purely cognitive (epistemic), for the interest of gaining understanding
(knowledge) by itself does not account for one kind of possibilities of seeds
(either their possibilities qua dissociated from social and other contexts, or
those qua ecological and/or social objects) being considered more significant than another.
Not only has adopting materialist strategies enabled research that has
been extraordinarily fruitful, but also it underlies great adaptability, ushering in new varieties of materialist strategies as research has unfolded-so
that, at various historical moments, when opportune we find strategies that
deploy (e.g.) mechanical categories, mathematically formulated laws of various types (deterministic and probabilistic, compatible or not with physicalistic reductionism), use of the mathematics of complexity and computer
modelling (see section 2.5). The fruitfulness and resourcefulness of materialist strategies are undoubtedly impressive and rightly establish a central
position for them in scientific institutions. But, by itsel£ this does not warrant exclusivity. What else is involved?
Elsewhere (Lacey 2002a; 20046, ch. 6) I have argued in detai1 that mutually reinforcing relationships between adopting materialist strategies and
holding specifically modern values concerning the control of natural objects
are cnicial.9 To give a summary statement, these values concern the scope of
control, its centrality in daily life, and that relatively they are not subordinated to other moral and social values-so that, for example, the expansion
of technologies into more and more spheres of life and into becoming the
means for solving more and more problems is especially highly valued, to
such an extent that the kind of ecological and social disruption caused by
this can be seen simply as the price of progress.10 It is acceptance of these
specifically modern values about control of natural objects, and their widespread manifestation in actual hegemonic institutions, not cognitive factors
alone, that account, for example, for the general perception that research
conducted under biotechnological strategies is more significant than that
conducted under agroecological ones (Lacey 2000; 2001 ). In line with this,
I have maintained that materialist strategies are adopted virtually exclusively in the institutions of modern science in important part because, on application, knowledge gained under them serves interests strongly linked
with these values about control. These interests conflict with those of the
emancipatory movements (like those that have been meeting at the World
Social Forum), among whom it is common to value highly (among other
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things) agroecological practices that aim simultaneously to further productivity, sustainability, preservation of biodiversity and social empowerment of
poor communities (Lacey 20026; 20036; Santos 2002). Knowledge gained
under materialist strategies serves these latter interests to a much lesser degree (for, by definition, these strategies have nothing to contribute directly to
identifying possibilities that are not defined in dissociation from human and
social contexts); and, in some cases, it contributes to undermine them.
On application, research conducted under materialist strategies (not in
each and every instance, but on the whole when pursued virtually exclusively) especially favors interests linked with the modern values about control (Lacey 2004a, ch. 10). Moreover, I have argued in neo-Baconian vein
(Lacey 2004a, ch. 6), that is why materialist strategies are virtually exclusively adopted: the deep embodiment of the values about control in modern hegemonic institutions-where they are reinforced, on the one hand,
by the values of capital and the market and, on the other hand, by those of
the military-explains this exclusivity, and the most compelling argument for
the exclusivity draws upon (in conjunction with the fruitfulness and resourcefulness of materialist strategies) mutually reinforcing relations that
exist between adopting materialist strategies and holding the values about
control. 11
It is the deep grip of these values about control on modern sensibilities
that renders the interpretation of science (summarized in section 1)
intelligible-and for many irresistible. These values pervade that interpretation so thoroughly, and it tends to be taken for granted that they represent
universal values, that their role becomes invisible to the proponents of the
interpretation. Then, indeed, there is no question of choosing between
some version of materialist strategies and other strategies. The methodological strictures of materialist strategies become casually identified with
those of science per se ( "the only explanation of reality," Baptista 2002, 94).
Then, applicability that is neutral among projects valued partly because they embody the values about control (whether the projects be those of capital, the
military or those of medicine-see Santos (1989, 149), but that otherwise
are valued differently depending on different personal and institutional values, is misidentified with applied neutrality in general.
Where the specifically modern values about control are held, there is
heightened interest in the possibilities of things qua dissociated from their
social and human context, that is, the possibilities that become actualized
in modern technologies (e.g., genetic engineering); so much so that, when
materialist strategies are adopted virtually exclusively, few barriers are posed
to inferring ceteris paribus from the confirmation of a theory that identifies
a particular technological possibility to the legitimacy of the social actualization of the possibility (Lacey 20046 ). The inference, of course, is mediated by positive value judgments about control; and these, I have argued,
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are effectively invisible where the interpretation of section 1 is dominant.
Then, scientific resources cannot easily be brought to bear decisively on the
ceteris paribus condition (just mentioned), for its satisfaction includes confirming such hypotheses as that there are no unacceptable side effects of the
technological implementation, and no better means to produce the goods
it is intended to produce. Hypotheses like these cannot be addressed exclusively under materialist strategies; these are matters on which "science" (as
understood in the predominant institutions of modern science) is largely
silent, but where the opinions of scientists can forever pe defended by
claiming that there is no "scientific" evidence against theril. This is clearly
illustrated in the case of genetically engineered seeds: what are the side effects of their widespread use on the environment and social arrangements,
and are they better than the agroecological alternatives (Lacey 2000; 2002c;
2003a; 2003b; 2004b)?
In the absence of research conducted under alternative strategies (e.g.,
agroecological ones), positive assessments of hypotheses about side effects
and alternative cannot be made in accordance with impartiality. Instead
such assessments tend to reflect the value judgments linked with the adoption of the strategy. This leaves untouched that the judgments made about
the (potential) efficacy of the technology may have been made in accordance with impartiality. Research conducted exclusively under materialist
strategies can generate hypotheses about efficacy that are accepted in accordance with impartiality, but generally not relevant hypotheses that are presuppositions of legitimacy of application. That values may play an indispensable role in the decision to adopt a strategy does not undermine that,
in research conducted under the strategy, theories may be accepted in accordance with impartiality (cf. Proctor 1991). The lack of applied neutrality,
which comes with this role of values, is consistent with impartiality.
Three Moments of Scientific Activity;
Possible Roles for Values at Them

To put some clear order and generality into these remarks consider again
the three moments that I introduced in section 1. On the model that I have
been sketching, values have legitimate and often indispensable roles at M1
and M3' but no indispensable role at M r At M3' no one disputes that an application is made because it is intended to serve specific interests, and thus
to further the manifestation of specific values, and that judgments of its legitimation depend upon a multiplicity of value judgments. On my model,
the key methodological decision made at M1 is about the adoption of a
strategy; and a strategy may (but not always) be adopted-subject, in the
long run, to research conducted under it being fruitful in generating theories that become accepted at M2 in accordance with impartiality-in view of
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mutually reinforcing relations between adopting it and holding certain values, and the interest in furthering those values. Adopting a strategy defines
the kinds of possibilities that may be identified in research (in important
cases), possibilities that, if identified and actualized, would serve interests
cultivated by the values linked with adopting the strategy. Adopting a strategy per se does not imply that possibilities of these kinds exist and, if so,
concretely what they are; such matters can only be settled at M2 where impartiality is the reigning aspiration.
Theories that are accepted in accordance with impartiality at M2, given that
they arise under a strategy, will offer understanding of domains of phenomena and possibilities of limited scope, whose limits can often be clarified by attention to the values implicated in adopting a strategy. Precisely
because of this, applied neutrality cannot generally be counted on to hold
(although there are plenty of well-known instances where a result, confirmed under materialist strategies, serves a great variety of interests). On
application, at M3' theories will tend to serve especially well the values
linked with the strategy under which they were developed and confirmed.
Thus, the only way in which the activity of science, as a whole, can aspire to
applied neutrality is to require that research be conducted under a multiplicity of strategies. Then, provided that a sufficient variety is actually well developed, we could expect that there would be scientific knowledge available
to inform projects valued from different value-outlooks.
According to my model there is no objection, in principle, to the active
development of a multiplicity of strategies, even where each particular strategy has mutually reinforcing relations with a particular value-outlook. This
achieves the "dedogmatization of science" that Santos (1989, 27) is striving
for and shows that autonomy of methodology (section 1.1) cannot be sustained. Furthermore, a significant measure of applied neutrality can arise
from methodological pluralism (Longino 1990; 2002), while it cannot
from the methodological monism that ensures cognitive neutrality. Moreover, returning to the agricultural example, key presuppositions of the legitimacy of the use of genetically modified seeds (no adverse side effects, no
better alternatives) can only be investigated empirically if multiple strategies are in play (Lacey 2000; 2001; 2002c; 2003a; 2003b ). While I do not
doubt that attempting to further the ideal of applied neutrality will generate
difficulties and tension in scientific practice (Lacey 2004a, ch. 10), it is integral to the alternative way of structuring science that my model underlies.
It permits us, in relevant fields, to develop multiple strategies with a clear
awareness of the way in which a strategy may have links with particular values-so that, in the first place, the values will not play an unrecognized role
in the acceptance and rejection of theories; secondly, controversies about
values may become part of the discussions of the worldwide community of
scientists, and scientists will have the freedom to opt for approaches that
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will enable them to identify possibilities that may serve interests like those
of the movements of the World Social Forum; and thirdly, science will not
be not excluded from the domain of democratic discussion.
Comment on the Controversy about A Discourse on the Sciences

Santos (1992, 13) speaks of "a global model of scientific rationality, with
some internal variation." I think that commitment to materialist strategies
best defines this model since, I have claimed, normally in the institutions
of modem science, science, qua rational activity, is said to be characterized
by the features that I attribute to research conducted under materialist
strategies. In these institutions knowledge gained in accordance with this
model normally excludes other forms of knowledge from serious consideration and considers them to be "less than scientific." This captures much of
what Santos says about the "global model." At times, however, he appears
to identify the model with the forms of materialist strategies present in
mechanistic conceptions or in classical mechanics, for he considers that the
transition from them to the strategies deployed in relativity theory and
quantum mechanics begins to break with the "global model" (Santos 1992,
22). In contrast, I interpret these as transitions to more sophisticated versions of materialist strategies, resourceful developments and strengthening
of the model that are rationalized by empirical and other cognitive factors,
without any special input from values and without bringing into theories,
generated under them, categories (like mental or holistic ones) that have no
place within materialist strategies (see also Freire 2005). The relationship
that I have identified between adopting materialist strategies and and holding the specifically modem values about control remains constant across
such transitions.
Santos foresees and wishes to hasten the transition from this "global
model" to an "emerging paradigm" -I prefer to anticipate a "new way of
structuring of scientific activity" (see section 3 below)-one (as expressed
insightfully in this book's subtitle) aiming to generate "prudent knowledges
for a decent life." He appears, as I interpret his text within my framework,
to discern two necessary, interconnected components in this transition: ( 1)
the gradual internal dissolution of materialist strategies, which he thinks is
already well under way, and (2) the recognition of a multiplicity of forms
of knowledge and its acquisition, which are reflective of cultural diversity
and the needs and interests of emancipatory movements.
1 do not expect that ( 1) will happen; I do not desire it in the physical sciences, and I am not swayed by the arguments Santos proposes for it. Where
he sees the "global model" as in internally generated decline, I, especially
when I reflect on the character of the strategies that frame relativity theory
and quantum mechanics and the enormous growth of the cognitiv~ and
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brain sciences, see its strength and its expansionary tendencies left
unchecked. Proposing ( 1) has been interpreted as rhetorical and obscurantist (Baptista 2002); and Santos' own label for his desired form of science,
"postmodern," appears to add an element of credence to making the same
charge against (2), for so-called postmodernist criticisms of science have often defended (or been caricatured as defending) the view that scientific theories are only open to sociological explanation and not to cognitive appraisal. This is irrelevant, however, in the present context. Those
"postmodernist" criticisms of science are not made by people close to
emancipatory practices, as is Santos. Emancipatory practices cannot afford
the luxury of drawing upon forms of understanding that do not meet the
most rigorous cognitive standards. (As indicated at the outset, all defensible
forms of appraisal of scientific theories, including that of a theory's potential relevance on application to emancipatory interests, presuppose their
positive cognitive appraisal.)
The important point is that the intelligibility of (2) and movement towards it are quite independent of (1 )-and, in other works of Santos (1989;
1999), (2)'s supposed link with (1) is not so prominent (even if not totally
abandoned). In my opinion, research conducted under materialist strategies (preserving its own internal integrity) should remain important, within
the kind of restructuring of scientific activity that I will attempt to articulate,
as one approach to gaining scientific knowledge among others. What degree of prominence it has should be a matter for ongoing negotiation
within strong democratic institutions. This, I believe, coheres with the main
lines of Santos' argument.

A NEW WAY OF STRUCTURING SCIENTIFIC ACTIVI1Y

To pose the question, "How should science be pursued in order to enhance
human well-being?" or to pose Rousseau's question, does not show misunderstanding of the nature of science or threaten its integrity. Quite the contrary! Not to pose it is to leave unquestioned the ongoing practice of science, which is predominantly shaped by mutually reinforcing relationships
with the specifically modern values about the control of natural objects and
the values (connected with capital and the military) that, in turn, reinforce
them. 12 This does not fit with the ideals of scientific practice.
In view of the model of scientific activity presented in section 2, we can
now restate the question: For the sake of enhancing human well-being,
what range of strategies needs to be pursued in scientific research ?13 (We
might add: Who should be the participants in the research at each of the key
moments of decision making, and what kinds of scientific institutions are
needed to pursue it effectively?) Conducting science in response to these
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questions would point to a new way of structuring scientific activity. I will
conclude this chapter by introducing four theses that point to features of
this new way. (I do not pretend that I have presented conclusive arguments
here, only indicators that need much more extensive development.) I offer
these theses as suggestions made in the spirit of those proposed in the final
section of Santos (1992): "All natural-scientific knowledge is social-scientific" (Santos 1989, 31 ); "All knowledge is local and total" (Santos 1992,
37); "All knowledge is self-knowledge" (Santos 1992, 40); "All scientific
knowledge aims at becoming common sense"(Santos 1992, 43). I leave it
for the reader to determine if my theses qualify, clarify, develop or contest
those of A Discourse on the Sciences.
Reciprocity of the Natural and Social Sciences
Answering the question, "For the sake of enhancing human well-being,
what range of strategies needs to be pursued in scientific research?" requires, not an a priori response, but the conduct of systematic empirical investigation that is, in part, social scientific. That is because a fundamental
dimension of human well-being is the exercise of cultivated, effective
agency. Such agency is exercised when one acts in the important aspects of
one's life, informed by one's beliefs, so that desires that are expressions of a
broad array of the values one holds are regularly satisfied (Lacey 20026 ).
Thus, answering the question requires understanding the range of values
(personal, moral, social) that people aspire to manifest in their lives, their
variation with culture, class and other factors, and what projects people
have developed (and aspire to develop) in order to further the exercise of
their agency. 14 We cannot discover what range of strategies need to be pursued in scientific research for the sake of enhancing human well-being (or
of gaining "prudent knowledge for a decent life"), unless we conduct this
kind of social inquiry.
Institutions of the restructured science will need to deal with the complex
reciprocal interplay between the natural and social sciences (d. Santos
1989, 69ff). Only in the course of inquiry in the social sciences can we discover what is the range of value-outlooks that frame conceptions of well-being that are espoused throughout the world. This inquiry will help to identify the limits of neutrality of research conducted under materialist strategies,
and any other strategy that may be developed. It will also identify value-outlooks that may be interested in possibilities ( e.g., those of emancipation
from dominant social structures), the exploration of which requires alternative strategies. Once the range of these value-outlooks has been identified, we can explore the set of strategies that may be desirable, in response
to my question, for directing research in current social circumstances. The
conduct of research, however, requires extensive and often expensive mate-
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rial and social conditions, so that it may not be possible to conduct research
to the desirable extent under all of the strategies. It follows that under which
of these strategies research actually will take place, and how priorities are set
among them, should be a matter for democratic deliberation and enactment (Santos 1989, 86). 15 (It is a major question for emancipatory politics
to address the issue of how such democratic decision-making could happen
in a reliable and effective way.) At the same time developments and applications of the natural sciences intervene in the social order, opening new
possibilities for human life, reorderings of priorities and, sometimes, revised value-outlooks, thus setting new tasks for the social sciences.
Thesis 1. There is a profound unity between the natural and the social sciences
based on their reciprocity.

There are also other dimensions to the interplay of the two kinds of sciences (Lacey 1990). Where the values about control and thus the interpretation of section 1 are uncontested, it is common to develop social sciences
and especially psychology (Lacey 2003c) under versions of materialist
strategies, so that the kind of categories (pertaining to the formulation of
laws, etc.) that are proper to the natural sciences developed under these
strategies penetrate into the social sciences-with the legitimation that this
is how to make these sciences "scientific." I have indicated (note 13) that I
think that materialist strategies will retain an important place in the restructured science, with research conducted under it properly maintaining
relative autonomy, without the penetration of categories from the human
sciences. 16 But it is part of the distinctness of materialist strategies that, in
the research conducted under them, phenomena and the possibilities they
permit are dissociated from links with lived experience, value and social
place. There is no reason, as I pointed out using the examples of "seeds," to
hold that all the possibilities of phenomena can be identified when such
dissociations are made. Moreover the same possibility identified with a description deploying the dissociated categories of materialist strategies may
be identical to a possibility characterized using social categories. For example, seeds that are produced by the techniques of genetic engineering ( describable under materialist strategies) are simultaneously commodities; so
that if we want to know the full range of consequences of using these seeds,
we need to investigate their effects qua commodities (social entities) as well
as their effects qua biological entities (Lacey 2001; 2002c; 2003a). Strategies
that are alternatives to materialist strategies, for example, agroecological
ones, may be designed in order to avoid these kinds of dissociations and
aim to identify possibilities of natural objects in relation to their ecological
and social contexts. In such strategies the routine categories of the natural
and social sciences will cut across each other in ways that make it impossible
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to separate the natural (biological) and the social. In these cases, rather
than reciprocity, we have thorough interpenetration.
Additional Theses
Thesis 2. Any item of scientific knowledge is produced and confirmed under a
particular strategy, which may be adopted because of its mutually reinforcing
relations with particular values; but, if it is soundly confirmed, consistency
with it is universally (rationally) demanded.

This follows directly from the model of scientific activity of section 2.
All strategies have a "local" or "limited" compass; none can aspire to encapsulate all the possibilities of phenomena. Gaining comprehensive understanding of phenomena requires the cultivation of a multiplicity of
strategies, where each one (in principle) is able to identify a particular
class of possibilities, and where interest in which may derive from valuing that some of those possibilities be realized in (technological) practice.
A strategy may draw upon the categories of traditional, local knowledge
of a culture, and then any knowledge gained under it will constitute a
continuation of the tradition. A considerable amount of knowledge
gained under agroecological strategies is of this kind (Altieri 1995 .) Alternatively, it may have mutually reinforcing relations with values ( e.g.,
the values about control) that are linked with forces with "global" reach;
but global reach is not the same thing as universal assent. Whatever the
case may be, items of knowledge are only gained when theories are accepted in accordance with impartiality. While it would be irrational to deliberately act in contradiction of knowledge confirmed in accordance
with impartiality or to reject it, simply because it was investigated under a
strategy linked with values that one does not endorse, nevertheless one is
not obliged rationally to enter into practices that are informed by such
knowledge. As we have seen, impartiality does not imply neutrality; positive judgments of the cognitive value of a proposition are consistent with
negative judgments of actions informed by it.
Thesis 3 . Scientific theories are produced and confirmed in the course of intentional activity, and the limits of the knowledge expressed in a theory are dependent on the goals of the agents engaged in that activity; so that a scientist's
understanding of what these limits are is well served by his having sound self
knowledge.

Scientists, I have claimed, have often misidentified their activity, incorrectly identifying research conducted under materialist strategies with scientific research per se. Self-knowledge-knowing well the goals of the activities in which one is engaged and why those goals have been adopted-is a
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good antidote to the tendency to misidentify the "local" knowledge gained
under materialist strategies with knowledge of universal social value.
Thesis 4. Scientific activity should (and can) be for the sake of furthering hu-

man well -being; its products thus enter deeply into the lives of everyone, so it
should be carried out constantly under democratic guidance and scrutiny.

Concluding Remark
A final observation: Santos describes his objective in A Discourse on the
Sciences as attempting to discern, with the rich array of sociological and historical methods that he commands, the contours of the emerging new way
of structuring science (or, in his words, the "emerging paradigm"). My approach, developed in the philosophy of science, complements Santos' and
it can be deepened by ongoing dialogue with his. I have argued, with basis
in my model of scientific activity (section 2 ), for the necessity of engaging
in research under a multiplicity of strategies. My four theses have elaborated
some of the implications of taking seriously the idea of multiple strategies.
I believe that this idea is indispensable for restructuring scientific activities
so that they become carried out for the sake of furthering human well-being ( cf. Santos 1989, 44). It is also indispensable for science to approach its
long-affirmed ideal of applied neutrality ( as distinct from the neutrality,
bounded by consensus on the specifically modem values about control of
natural objects, that is endorsed by the interpretation of science laid out in
section 1). The interests of genuine scientific neutrality and human emancipation can live happily together and mutually support each other.

NOTES
1. Philip Kitcher has raised questions like these repeatedly, within a broadly liberal perspective, over the past decade (especially in Kitcher 1997, 2001). Compare
Kitcher's formulations with the more radical ones of Paul Feyerabend and Robert
Proctor: "being related to each other in lawful ways, [the entities unearthed by science] can be manipulated or predicted by using these laws. There can be new combinations of them and new entities may in this way arise at the phenomenological
level. But these entities are important only if the resulting world is pleasant to live
in, and if the gains of manipulation more than compensate for the losses entailed
by the losses of unscientific layers. The objection that the entities and laws that connect them are 'real' and that we must adapt to them, no matter how dismal the consequences, has no weight" (Feyerabend 1999, 12). "What we need is a political philosophy of science, a philosophy that focuses on the forms of power in and around
the sciences. The question for the political philosopher of science is [:] ... Who benefits from knowledge (or ignorance!) of a certain sort, and who suffers? How might
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the practice of science be different? . . . We must also ask political, ethical, and activist
questions: Why do we know what we know and why don't we know what we don't
know? What should we know and what shouldn't we know? How might we know
differently? (Proctor 1991, 13)
Compare these remarks with others made by Feyerabend (1993) on criticizing science in the light of "humanitarian" and "democratic" considerations and his repeated suggestions (Feyerabend 1993, 1999) that following a single approach to science threatens human well-being (Lacey 2001 ). Feminist philosophers of science
(e.g., Anderson 1995; Longino 1990, 2002) have proposed yet further variations of
questions like these.
2. Throughout the chapter by "values" I mean "moral and social values;" similarly "value judgment." There is a basically uncontroversial role for cognitive values
at the core of science (Lacey 2004, ch. 3 ), but it is not be discussed here. The claim,
which is crucial for my arguments, that cognitive values (or the criteria for appraising the cognitive value of theories) are distinct from moral and social values, has
been disputed. For my response, see Lacey (2004a, ch. 9; 2004b ).
3. Autonomy should be qualified by: "provided that the research practices do not
involve morally unacceptable actions or outcomes." Sometimes, then, in certain
domains empirical data needed for making theoretical appraisals should not be
obtained. Sometimes the value of gaining knowledge is subordinate to other moral
values. This does not imply that moral values may function among the criteria of
theory appraisal, but only that sometimes we may limit the quest for knowledge
on moral grounds. My formulation allows that, at any given time, where the general characteristics of a line of research are settled, cognitive interests leave open a
range of problems that are (we might say) 'cognitively equally worthy' of further
investigation. Then which of these problems is chosen (e.g., to study one virus
rather than another) as a research priority may reflect values. Autonomy implies
that, qua scientific problem, the one chosen has no special primacy, so that scientific institutions should not (as a whole) be dominated by an agenda defined by
these values. As described, autonomy is compatible with values playing an important part in the choices of research projects of individual scientists ( and particular
scientific institutions). Arguments for science is value free usually draw upon premises such as: there is a sharp separation between fact and value; values express subjective preferences, etc. Then, while it may be a fact that individual scientific
choices reflect values, the subjectivity of values is taken to make it likely that
choices representing a diversity of values will be made among the community of
scientists, thus ensuring that particular values do not come to dominate the research agenda.
4. For extensive analysis and criticism of science is value free, and its component
notions, see Lacey (2002a; 2004a).
5. For the full details and the arguments, see especially Lacey (2004a). Most of
the next section is taken from Lacey (2002b) and draws upon Lacey (2004b ).
6. I have stated the objective (albeit contentiously) so as to encompass all inquiries that are called "sciences" (including social sciences) and those that bear close
affinities with them (see Lacey 1991, ch. 5). I include under "science" all forms of
systematic empirical inquiry, because I do not want to rule out by definitional fiat, or
to assume a priori, that forms of knowledge that are in continuity with traditional
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forms of knowledge have comparable epistemic (cognitive) status to those of modern science. Also, I want a notion of "science" that is sufficiently inclusive that, in
principle, no proposition about the world need be held to be excluded from the
realm of scientific inquiry. (That does not mean that scientific inquiry will, in fact,
be able to address them all.) In accordance with this usage of "science," any reasonably systematic structure that expresses understanding of some domain of phenomena counts as a theory. (Often it is preferred to limit "theory" to that which has
mathematico-deductive structure or that which contains representations of laws,
and not merely richly descriptive or narrative structure.) The effect of deploying this
wider notion of "science," which-as we will see-underlies the new way of structuring scientific activity (that permits a multiplicity of research strategies) that I propose, is to strengthen the empirical credentials that may be provided for claims
made under the authority of science.
7. For the relationship between "strategy" and Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigm," see Lacey (2004a, 261). "Strategy" is closely connected with what Ian Hacking calls "form of knowledge" (Hacking 1999).
8. The success of research conducted under agroecological strategies (Altieri
1995; references in Lacey 2002c) shows that accord witl1 impartiality can be reached
under strategies that are not reducible to materialist ones (Lacey 2001; 2003b ).
9. In Lacey (2004a, ch. 5) I consider and reject other arguments for the virtually
exclusive adoption of materialist strategies, including arguments based upon materialist metaphysics and Kuhn's philosophy of science. Note that for Santos (1992,
18) "modern science [as a) hegemonic model of rationality" is linked with "its capacity to control and transform [the real)."
10. In Lacey (2002a) I fill out this summary statement by explicitly offering a list
of the values, and exploring the presuppositions of rationally holding them.
11. I describe the multiple dimensions of this mutually reinforcing relationship
in Lacey (2002a; 2004a, 117-26). I do not claim that all research under materialist
strategies is conducted for the sake of furthering the values about control. Deploying
them exclusively for exploring many phenomena (e.g., celestial, subatomic) is unobjectionable and is not rationalized by reference to the values. (Even so, given the
dependence of research in these areas on "high" technological developments, links
with the values about control are not absent.) Moreover (see section 2.5) the furtherance of the values about control was not a causal factor ( although it was a consequence) in the transition from the strategies of classical mechanics to those of relativity and quantum mechanics.
12. To question the values about control, as members of the World Social Forum
do, does not mean that no value is attributed to control of natural objects, but only
that the value of control is subordinated to or balanced with other social values
(e.g., community empowerment, cultural integrity, preservation of biodiversity) . Cf.
the following remark, referring to Santos' desire to "destroy the hegemony of modern science without undercutting the expectations that it generates ... The new configuration of knowledge is, thus, the guarantee of the desire and the desire of the
guarantee that technological development would contribute to the deepening of
cognitive and communicative competence, and so it becomes transformed into
practical knowledge and helps us to provide sense and authenticity to our existence"
(Santos 1989, 46; my translation) .
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13. I believe that materialist strategies will always be in the range, even that it may
properly be granted a special place (Lacey 2001; 2004a, ch. 10). One reason for this
is that strategies like agroecological ones utilize results of research conducted under
materialist strategies in numerous indispensable ways. Such strategies should not be
seen as complete alternatives to materialist strategies, but more as an interlocking set
of local approaches each of which draws upon the results gained under materialist
strategies, where convenient. Each one also qualifies claims that are put forward
when materialist strategies are granted exclusivity. I do not know what eventual answers to my restated question might be like. I have explored it in detail only in connection with agricultural science. There I have argued that a multiplicity of strategies
(including agroecological ones) is essential (Lacey 2000; 2002c; 2003a; 2003b). I am
confident that this is so in other domains too. But, it might turn out to be the case
that in some fields, for example, subatomic physics, research under materialist strategies suffices; certainly, regarding this field, I have no alternative speculations to offer.
14. In note 10, I referred to the presuppositions of rationally holding the modern values about control. I have argued that all value-outlooks have presuppositions
of a broadly factual character (Lacey 2004a, ch. 2). The social science inquiry, which
I am referring to here, should also appraise the evidence that supports such presuppositions, including those of the value-outlooks of emancipatory movements. Not
all value-outlooks that are articulated by people are worthy of serious recognition;
those that rest upon clearly false presuppositions certainly are not.
15. Certainly there is nothing about the expertise cultivated by professional scientific practitioners under any strategy that especially prepares them for making
these choices.
16. Democratic decision-making applies to priorities and allocation ofresources
at M 1 and it is obviously relevant in all sorts of ways at M3 , but it does not apply at
the moment of accepting theories. Maintaining impartiality at M2 is of utmost importance, regardless of the strategy under which the theories have been developed.
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